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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE P. HA·NSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
GENERAL BUILDERS SUPPLY 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and STEPHEN G. KNIGHT, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
9884 
BRIE.F OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is 63 years old. He is an outo-
mobile mechanic by trade and owns and operates 
his own business known as J. P. Hanson Auto Ser-
vice which is located at 125 West 21st South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (R. 42, 43). On August 31, 1960 
at approximately 11:30 a.m. plaintiff was driving 
his 1936 Dodge one-half ton pickup truck east on 
21st South Street in Salt Lake City intending to 
deliver an automobile transmission to the Automatic 
Exchange Transmission Company located at 17th 
South and State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(R. 43). 
As he reached the intersection at State Street 
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in the left turn lane, the light turned red for east .. 
bound traffic and he stopped. He was the first car 
at the intersection. He testified that his brake lights 
were operating and his left turn signal light was 
on. (R. 47). He did not give an arm signal of his 
intention to stop. (R. 138, 140). 
After coming to a stop, plaintiff's truck was 
struck from the rear by the General Builders 
Supply truck which was being driven by defendant, 
Stephen G. Knight. He was in the course of making 
a delivery of building materials and supplies and 
had driven the 1950 Ford 11f2-ton flatbed truck from 
General Builders Supply at 255 West 27th South in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 171). 
The plaintiff testified that his truck came to 
rest in the extreme west lane of traffic on State 
Street. (R. 137). Defendant, Stephen G. Knight, 
testified that on impact he pushed plaintiff's truck 
approximately 10 feet; that the front of his truck 
was in the pedestrian lane when it stopped with 12 
to 18 inches separating the front of his truck and 
the rear of plaintiff's truck. (R. 174, 175). There 
was no damage to the front of defendant's truck. 
(R. 178}". The tail gate, rear fender and tail light 
on plaintiff's 1936 Dodge pickup were damaged. (R. 
50). Plain tiff made repairs in his own . shop for 
which he claimed damages of $75.00. (R. 132, 133, 
Exhibit 8). 
Defendant, Stephen G. Knight, was 22 years 
old; he had driven a truck for the General Builders 
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Supply during the summer months since 1958. He 
had a Class "A" chauffeur's license. (R. 170-171). 
Just prior to the accident, he was traveling east 
on 21st South Street at approximately 25 to 30 miles 
per hour. As he approached the intersection of State 
Street behind the plaintiff, he knew he was going 
to have to stop. He applied his foot brake - there 
was no response. He pumped the brake - there was 
still no response so he applied the hand brake which 
slowed him to approximately 5 miles per hour when 
he ran into the rear of plaintiff's pickup truck. (R. 
173). 
The truck defendant was driving was used less 
frequently than other trucks belonging to the 
defendant, General Builders Supply. It was used 
for incidental deliveries. He had driven the truck 
on occasions prior to the accident. (R. 176). 
On the morning of the accident, he had driven the 
truck around in the defendant's building supply 
yard picking up his load. He applied the brakes on 
several occasions and noted nothing unusual about 
the brakes. (R. 176, 177). He drove the truck from 
27th South to 21st South and east to the point of the 
accident but could not recall any specific point at 
which he had to apply brakes prior to the accident 
and after leaving the defendant's yard. (R. 177). 
The brake lining on defendant's truck was checked 
and examined by mechanic Gail R. Staley in May 
of 1960. (R. 200). The brakes were also adusted by 
Staley between July 7th and July 12th, 1960, six to 
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seven weeks prior to the accident. (R. 198). Follow-
ing the accident, plaintiff asked defendant, Knight, 
what had happened. Knight stated that his brakes 
had failed. (R. 48). 
Immediately after the accident, the plaintiff got 
out of his truck unassisted. He testified that he 
was holding his neck and head, (R. 49) and was ex-
periencing pain in his neck. (R. 49). He and de-
fendant Knight moved the transmission that he was 
hauling which weighed 180 lbs., to the forward end 
of his truck. (R. 134). They exchanged names. No 
police were called ~o make an investigation. (R. 50, 
175). Plaintiff delivered the transmission to the 
Automatic· Transmission Exchange Company and 
then went to his home for the remainder of the day. 
(R.- 50). He s·ecured a replacement transmission 
the follo'Ying day returning it to his garage. There-
after; he would go to his business for part of the 
day but until the first of the year, left ·tlie'inechnical 
rabor to his regular employees and did no labor him-
self. because of pain in his neck. At the tin:e of 
the trial, he was still unable to perform some 
mechanical labor that he had done prior to the acci-
dent. (R. 53, 142, 143). Plaintiff's books and records 
reflect a continuous increase in net profits each 
month and each year following the accident as com-
pared with months and years prior thereto. (R. 143, 
144, 148 through 150, Exhibits 9 and 10). 
Plaintiff was examined and given adjustments 
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by Dr. Billiter, a chiropractor, ten days or two 
weeks following the accident. (R. 54, 124, 125). He 
was examined on September 19, 1960, by Dr. Owen 
Reese and continued under his care and treatment. 
(R. 70, 78). Dr. Boyd Holbrook examined plaintiff 
April 28, 1961, and on November 27, 1962. (R. 92, 
96). Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Reed Clegg on 
November 15, 1962. 
Plaintiff had an extensive degenerative arthri-
tis condition in his neck at the time of the accident. 
(R. 7 4, 94, 95, 126, 127). 
This case was tried to a jury beginning Decem-
ber 4, 1962. At the conclusion of the evidence, the 
trial judge found the defendants liable as a matter 
of law and submitted the case to the jury on the 
question of damages alone. The jury awarded the 
plaintiff $387.00 in special damages and the sum of 
$22,500.00 in general damages. · 
Thereafter, a motion 'vas made on behalf of the 
defendants for a new trial on the ground that the 
Court erred in law by not submitting the issue of 
defendant's liability to the jury and upon the fur-
ther ground that the judgment was excessive. De-
fendants, by their motion in the alternative, asked 
the trial Court to order a remittitur and reduce the 
judgment to a reasonable amount based upon the 
evidence. The defendants' motion was denied on 
February 28, 1963. (R. 27). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS , 
POINT I 
THE· COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFEND-
ANTS LiABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND.IN RE-
FUSIN<f TO 'SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' 
NEGLIGENCE r_fO THE ~U~Y. ., . 
. POINT ll 
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE, UNSUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND. IS THE RESULT OF PASSION 
AND PREJUDICE AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR A NEW~TRIAL. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO 
ORDER A REMITTITUR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFEND-
ANTS LIABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND IN RE-
FUSING TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' 
NEGLIGENCE. TO THE JURY. 
. . 
The ·plaintiff claimed as specific acts of negli-
gence that defendant Kn~ght was following too close 
to plaintiff's vehicle, that he was not maintaining a 
proper lookout arid that he was operating a vehicle 
with·-defective orin'adequate brakes. The defendants 
denied that they were negligent and denied any 
knowledge of defective brakes prior to the accident. 
(R. 4, 3~). 
r The rule as ·to liability where an ·automobile is 
operated- with defective brakes is set forth in Vol. 
5A, A.m. Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffic, 
Section 248, and in .part states as follows: 
"* * * th~ mere faihire, of brakes to func-
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tion properly is not conclusive of the driver's 
negligence. It seems that where the brakes 
on an automobile have previously functioned 
properly but suddenly fail to respond, their 
failure does not render the owner guilty of 
negligence or contributory negligence, unless 
he had knowledge of the defective condition." 
In Alarid v. Vanier, 317 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1957), 
the defendant's brakes failed to operate resulting in 
a collision with another automobile which had 
stopped in response to a signal light. The Court 
said: 
"In the absence of evidence indicating 
that respondent was chargeable with know-
ledge that the brake was not or might not be 
in good condition, the brake failure might 
well be accepted by the jury a:s a sufficient 
excuse or justification of the· violation. In 
the driving of automobiles such brake failures 
are not unknown and they frequently come 
suddenly, without any warning. The average 
driver is not a mechanical expert, and is not 
necessarily in a position to anticipate such 
mechanical failure. The essential question 
in such case is not as to exactly what caused 
the mechanical failure but is as to whether he 
had or should have had some prior knowledge 
of facts which should have led him to take 
proper steps in advance which might have 
prevented the brake failure. Unforeseen 
brake failure is a circumstance beyond the 
control of the driver in the ordinary case, and 
the evidence here supports the implied find .. 
ing of the jury that this brake failure re-
sulted from a cause or thing beyond the 
control of the respondent." 
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In Lockmoeller v. Keil, 137 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 
1940), the Court stated: 
"In this case the evidence that truck was 
equipped with the kind of brakes contem-
plated by the statute, that they had been ad-
justed a week before the accident, and that 
they had performed properly only one short 
block to the east of the point of the collision 
when they had last been applied, made it a 
question for the jury as to whether defend-
ants, Burns and Hamlet, were to be convicted 
of actionable negligence because of the fact 
that the brakes on their truck were not in 
good working order at the very moment of 
the collision." 
, In Trudeau v. Sina Construction Company, 62 
N.W.2d 492 (Minn. 1954), it was held that the failure 
of truck brakes which had previously functioned 
properly and which had been repaired two weeks 
before the accident did not necessarily render owner 
or operator of the truck guilty of negligence, but 
presented merely prima facia case, and together 
with evidence that operator of the truck had pumped 
foot brake and had attepted to shift into a lower 
gear to stop the truck as he approached the stop 
sign, although he had not attempted to apply the 
emergency brake, presented an issue for determina-
tion by jury as to whether the truck driver had been 
confronted with an emergency not of his own mak-
ing and as to whether or not he had acted as a rea-
sonably prudent person would have acted in the 
same or similar circumstances. 
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In Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines, 108 So. 409 
(Miss. 1959), the Court held that: 
"The fact that brakes of an automobile 
are defective is material in determining the 
question of negligence in case of a collision 
where the driver knew or should by proper 
care have known of the defect, but mere fail-
ure of brakes to function properly is not con-
clusive of the driver's negligence but only 
makes a prima facia case which the driver 
may defend by showing proper inspection 
and a sudden failure without warning." 
In Eddy v. McAninch, 347 P.2d 499 (Colo. 1959), 
the defendant had purchased an automobile a week 
before the accident. He testified that he had had no 
trouble until the time of the accident; that as heap-
proached the intersection where the collision oc-
curred, he attempted to apply his brakes but there 
was no response; that he then tried to use his hand 
brake with the same result. There was evidence that 
the brakes had been inspected and were in good con-
dition before the sale of the automobile to the de-
fendant. Upon a jury verdict in favor of the 
defendant, plaintiff appealed claiming defendant 
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. The 
Colorado Supreme Court, in affirming the judg-
ment, cited the case of Alarid v. Vanier, supra, and 
stated in conclusion: 
"Under the circumstances appearing 
from this record, we think the question of 
whether the presumption of negligence aris-
ing from failure of the defendant's brakes to 
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operate in accordance with the provisions of 
the Motor Vehicle Law, had been overcome 
by evidence, and that the accident resulted 
from causes beyond the control of the defend-
ant, was one of fact for the jury which by 
its verdict re'Solved the issue in favor of the 
defendant. * * *" 
In Best v. Huber, 3 U.2d 177, 281 P.2d 208, 
(Utah 1955), the defendant testified that she was 
traveling about 25 miles per hour and that she ap-
plied her brakes 21/2 to 3 car lengths away from the 
plaintiff's car, which was stopped at an intersection; 
that when 'She pressed the brake pedal, it went to 
the floor board. She pumped the brakes two or 
three times and didn't have time to use the hand 
brake nor turn aside in order to avoid hitting plain-
tiff's car in the rear. She further testified that she 
had used the foot brake on a hill just previous to the 
accident and that at that time she had full braking 
power and was surpri'Sed by the sudden failure of 
the brakes at the intersection. 
Upon a jury verdict for the plaintiff, defendant 
appealed contending that the accident resulted from 
an unforseeable mechanical failure and that she was 
not liable as a matter of law. 
The Court in affirming the judgment and hold-
ing that the evidence presented a jury question said: 
"It has been frequently announced by 
thi'S Court that negligence is a question for 
the jury unless all reasonable men must draw 
the same conclusion from the facts as they 
10 
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are shown (cases cited). 'As was ·said·in Lin-
den v. Anchor Mining Company~ 20 Utah 134, 
58 Pac. 355, 358: ·'Where there is uncertainty 
as to the existence of either negligence or 
contributory negligence, the question is not 
one of law, but of fact, and to ·be settled by 
a jury; and this, whether the·· ·Uncertainty 
arises from a conflict in the testimo:ny or 
because the facts, being· undisp~ted," fair-
minded men will honestly draw different-con:. 
elusions from them.' " 
There was no· evidence that the defendant, 
Stephen G. Knight, was following too close or that 
he failed to maintain a proper lookout. His· testi-
mony that his brakes failed to respond suddenly and 
without prior warning coupled with· the; eviderice 
of prior inspection and adustrnent by the mechanic 
that maintained defendant's equip:ment clearly, 
raised issues as to the defendant's negligence that 
should have been submitted to the jury.· 
POINT ll 
THE VERDICT IS EXCESSIVE, UNSUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND IS THE RESULT OF PASSION 
AND PREJUDICE AND THE TRIAL-COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS'. MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO 
ORDER A REMITTITUR. 
Appellants recognize that plaintiff testified at 
the trial that he was not aware of the fact :that he 
4ad an osteoarthritic condition in his neck prior to 
the accident and that he had not suffered any pain 
from his neck before the accident.· (R. 65, 66). Dr. 
Rees and ·Dr. Holbrook both testifi<~d that, assum-
ll 
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ing the plaintiff had had no pain before the acci-
dent, the accident could have precipitated the pain 
and stiffness complained of by the plaintiff. (R. 77, 
99). Dr. Holbrook e'Stimated that the plaintiff had 
a 20% disability that might be reduced to 10% 
through surgery. (R. 104). 
It is undisputed, however, that plaintiff had a 
pre-existing arthritic condition in his neck. Both 
Drs. Holbrook and Clegg, who are specialists in the 
field of orthopedics, testified as to thi'S condition. 
Dr. Holbrook described the condition as "rather 
marked degenerative changes in the lower portions; 
that is, between the fifth and sixth and seventh 
cervical vertebrae." (R. 94). Dr. Clegg described 
plaintiff's neck condition as one involving extensive 
degenerative arthritis and that t had developed to 
the extent that the fourth and fifth cervical verte-
brae had fused together making a solid union. (R. 
126, 127.) Dr. Holbrook stated that the plaintiff's 
symptoms could be secondary to his arthritis (R. 
108) and that examining earlier x-rays taken by 
Dr. Reese he found no evidence of fracture or tone 
injury related to the accident. (R. 107). 
Dr. Clegg, from his examination, found no evi-
dence of trauma or injury from whiplash and testi-
fied that the rather extensive osteoarthritic changes 
in plaintiff's neck were sufficient to account for 
plantiff's complaint of pain, tenderness and muscle 
spasm and that the syn1pton1s were consistent with 
the degree of arthritis fron1 which plaintiff was 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mffering. (R. 128. While plaintiff testified that 
1e was unable to perform lal::or at. h1s garage for 
;orne three or four months following the accident, 
1e admitted that he made daily visits to his garage 
where his regular mechanics were working. (R. 
L42, 143). His books and records disclos·e an in-
;rease in his business and net profits during this 
period as compared with similar periods prior to 
the accident, as well as an increase in his· annual 
aet profits each year following the.accidertt as com-
pared with prior years. (R . . ~4?, 148 through 150, 
Exhibit 9 and 10). . nr ~:~Lr .: 
This Court, in several cas'ci, held that a verdict 
so excessive as to appear. to hav:e .been given under 
the influence of passion and prejudice; and the trial 
Court abusing its discretion in denyitrg· a mo'tion 
for a new trial, may order the · verdicbset aside and 
a new trial granted. Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 
431; 184 -P.2d 123. 
The Court has quoted with approval the'·lan-
guage of the Pauly v. McCarthy.case. In the case 
of Stamp v. Union Pacific Railroad· Company, 5 
Utah d 387; 303 P2d 279, the opinion approved the 
statement of the law in the Pauly v. McCarthy case 
and quoted from that case as follows: 
"Attention is called to the language of 
this Court in that (Pauly v. McCarthy) case 
as follows at pages 434-6 of the Utah Reports 
and page 125) of the Pacific Reporter: ·'but 
from the language used in these and .other 
decisions, a view developed that· this Court 
13 
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was powerless to interfere with a jury ~er­
dict, no matter how outrageous. Th1s VIew 
was exploded in the case of Jensen v. Denver 
& R.G.W.R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185, 
1192, where, after citing with approval many 
of the cases above cited, we said: 'still the 
jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled 
and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new 
trial on motion of the aggrieved party may 
be granted by the court below on the ground 
of 'exces'Sive damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or pre-
judice.' Whenever that is made to appear, 
the Court, when its action is properly in-
voked, should require a remission or set the 
verdict aside and grant a new trial."'" 
This Court has held that it can and should grant 
a new trial if the verdict is so excessive as to show 
that it must have been motivated by prejudice or 
ill will toward a litigant, or that passion such as 
anger, resentment, indignation or some kindred 
emotion has so overcome or distorted the jury's 
reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful or 
punitive, it should unconditionally re set aside. 
Wheat v. D&RGWR Company, 122 Utah 418, 250 
P.2d 932. 
Appellants recognize that the Utah Court rec-
nizes two clas'Ses of cases: one class of cases where 
a new trial must be ordered if the verdict is the 
result of passion and prejudice, and a class of cases 
whereby a remittitur is demanded by the ends of 
justice. Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d 
123; Morg.an v. Ogden Union Depot, 77 Utah 541, 
14 
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294 P.2d 541, Ward v. D&RGWR Co., 96 Utah 564, 
85 P.2d 837. 
The Utah Court has long held that it may be 
proper to order a remission of the excess verdict 
where passion and prejudice were not necessarily 
present, but if passion and prejudice were present, 
a new trial 'Should be granted. See Eleganti v. 
Standard Coal Company, 50 Utah 585, 168 Pac. 266, 
and McAfee v. Ogden Union R.R. Depot Co., 62 
Utah 116, 218 Pac. 98. 
In the case of Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 118 Utah 82, 218 P~2d 1080, the Court 
said: 
"Previously decided cases ar·e of little 
value in fixing present day. standards or in 
assisting courts in determining excessive 
awards." 
This quotation wa;s approved in Stamp v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company case, 5 U.2d 387, 303 
P.2d 279, and the Court in that case in ordering a 
remittitur or a new trial stated: 
"Holding as we do, that the verdict is 
without all reasonable bounds for the detailed 
injury, we then have the duty of ordering a 
new trial, or ordering a remittitur. Since 
the jury's verdict can be of no help to us, 
we must exercise our best judgment in ar-
riving at a fair and just amount to compen-
sate plaintiff for his injury." 
In that case quoted there was nothing for the 
Court upon which to base a holding of passion and 
prejudice except the amount of the verdict. 
15 
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The plaintiff is 63 years old. He was never 
hospitalized following the accident. He followed 
only a conservative treatment under the care of 
Dr. Reese. He had a marked degenerative arthritic 
condition in his neck at the time of the accident. 
While curtailing his physical labor following the ac-
cident, he admittedly continued daily contact and 
supervision of his business. The sum of $22,500.00 
general damages in such a case clearly appears to 
have been given as a result of passion and prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants respectfully represent to the 
Court that the defendants should be awarded a new 
trial or in the alternative the Court should order 
a remittitur and reduce the judgment to a reason-
able amount based upon the evidence of the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
ROBERT W. BRANDT 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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